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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 06/03/2004

Accident number: 402

Accident time: 11:25

Accident Date: 20/07/2001

Where it occurred: MNB West, Rasa
Koshare: Dossier
W02-37, MF 305

Country: Kosovo

Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: BoI: 009/2001: TKG

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 26/07/2001
Name of source: KMACC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMA-2 AP blast

Ground condition: woodland
rocks/stones

Date record created: 05/03/2004

Date last modified: 05/03/2004

No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR 34T DN 3450 0255 Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
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Accident report
What follows is the original Board of Inquiry report, edited for anonymity and with excess
pictures removed.

REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No 009/2001
Mine Accident that occurred in MNB West on Friday 20 July 2001 in which [Demining group]
Section Leader [The Victim] was injured.

Introduction
1. In accordance with the Mine Action Co-ordination Center (MACC) Standard Working
Procedure No 4, the MACC Programme Manager issued a Convening Order on Friday 20
July 2001 for an Accident Investigation Board of Inquiry. Annex A details the Convening
Order.
2. This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the mine accident that
occurred on Friday 20 July 2001. Based on the investigation, interviews, statements from
[Demining group] personnel involved in the accident, visits and photos of the accident
site, this accident is considered to be non-preventable.
3. This finding is based on the fact that at the time of the accident the Section Leader [the
Victim] was walking in a manually cleared area conducting her duties as Section Leader.
The manual clearance of this lane had been cleared according to [Demining group]
clearance procedures and also in accordance with the [Demining group] Threat
Assessment for this minefield, which is excavation to a depth of 5cm. This mine was at a
depth of 16cm. This minefield is nearing completion and all previous blast mines found in
this minefield have been located within this depth of 5cm.
4. The accident occurred at one of the Rasa Koshare minefield’s, Task Dossier Number
W02-37, minefield number 305, GR 34T DN 3450 0255 on 20 July 2001 at 1125 hours.

Events leading up to the Accident
5. [Demining group] have one manual clearance team conducting operations at minefield
number 305. This minefield has three rows of mines that consist of PMR2A antipersonnel fragmentation mines, as well as PMA1 and PMA2 anti-personnel blast mines.
This team employs a two man one lane drill whereby one person works whilst the other
rests. [The Victim] is a Section Leader in this team. Her duties and responsibilities require
her to be in the clearance lanes supervising the deminers in her section.
6. On the morning of the accident a pile of mines were discovered at the base of a large tree
approximately 7 metres before the seat of the explosion, this pile consisted of 8 x
PMR2A, 1 x PMA1 and 1 x PMA2. [The Victim] had disarmed these mines and they were
removed. The clearance lane then continued. In this lane there is a large rock, and beside
this rock a PMR2A was discovered as well as 3 x PMA2. These mines were all disarmed
and removed. The deminer was continuing with the clearance of this lane when [the
Victim] came into the lane and was in the process of erecting mine marking tape when
she stepped on what is believed to be a PMA2 blast mine. As a result of the explosion her
right foot was traumatically amputated, and she was thrown to the ground. The force of
the explosion was such that it blew her foot 30m up the hill and onto the road, along with
her right boot. The deminer that was working in this lane was 2m from the blast, and he
received a superficial injury to his shoulder. Immediately after the blast [the Victim] was
carried from the lane up to the road where she was given first aid treatment and
stabilised. From here she was taken by ambulance to await the arrival of the CASEVAC
helicopter at HLS – Red 26, 2km down the hill.
7. The helicopter arrived at the HLS at 1159hrs, [the Victim] was loaded and the helicopter
departed arriving at the Italian KFOR Hospital in Peja at 1207hrs. She was in the
operating theatre within the hour of the accident.
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8. This is the fifth mine accident that [Demining group] have had since May of this year,
although it is the first for this particular minefield.

VIEWS OF ACCIDENT SITE

VICTIM’S RIGHT BOOT

The Victim’s [ROFI] vest was cut from [the Victim] by the medics during the first aid treatment.
The helmet (with a long visor) was shown with the visor unmarked but with blood stains on
the top of the helmet.

Work History of the Casualty
9.

[The Victim] has been working for [Demining group] since September 1999. She is
considered to be a very diligent and trustworthy Section Leader, and carries out her
duties and responsibilities in a professional manner.

Past History of the Area
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10. The accident site is Task Dossier W02 – 37, at minefield number 305. The minefields in
this task dossier are all in the Rasa Koshare area, which is on the Kosovo – Albanian
border. There was heavy fighting in this location during the war and there are numerous
minefields along this border area. The minefields contain anti-personnel mines of both
fragmentation and blast, and are predominantly laid in very high densities.
11. The [Another demining group] conducted clearance operations in this minefield from July
– November 2000.

Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking
12. The Task Dossier No W02-37 was issued to [Demining group] on 17 February 2001. As
stated this was a minefield that Halo Trust had previously conducted clearance in,
although had not completed.

Geography and Weather
13. The area in general is the Kosovo – Albanian Border approximately 25km NW from
Gjakova. The border region around this area is mountainous and covered with forest and
bush. The road access to this site is through the village of Junik. The route from here is
a 12km very uneven gravel road which winds its’ way up to the minefield. The weather at
the time of the accident was fine with a temperature of approximately 25 degrees celsius.

Site Layout and Marking
14. The site layout and marking at the site was in accordance with the [Demining group]
SOPs for mineclearance. This minefield is on a hillside, and the lane in which the
accident occurred is approximately 30m below the main dirt road that makes its’ way to
the top of the mountain. According to the Vojska Jugoslavije (VJ) minefield record, there
are three mine rows containing PMR 2A fragmentation mines with PMA1 and PMA2 blast
mines as keepers. The mine rows are running generally up the hill and were laid across
the main dirt road and then continue up the hill.

Management Supervision and Discipline
15. [Demining group] direct supervision on site is achieved by having a National Team Site
Supervisor. There is a National Senior Demining Supervisor that over-sees the
supervision of all demining sites, and managing all [Demining group] clearance
operations is an International Operations Officer.

Quality Assurance and Quality Control
16. [Demining group] Quality Control is achieved through a system of on-site checks by the
Section Leaders and Team Leaders to ensure adherence to the mineclearance SOP’s.
The MACC QA teams conduct external Quality Assurance on a regular basis, normally
each site is visited a minimum of once per week.

Communications and Reporting
17. At the time of the accident there was effective communication by VHF hand-held Motorola
radios between the section leaders and team site supervisor on their internal net. There
was further communication by hand-held VHF radios from the team site, and [Demining
group] base situated in Hereq also on the [Demining group] internal net. he
communications between callsign 52 ([Demining group] base), callsign 51and callsign kilo
foxtrot (KFOR) is on the MNB (W) VHF channel 4.
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18. At the time of the accident the MACC QA Team Leader was in the region and he
monitored all communications in regards to the accident on the MNB(W) channel.

Medical Details
19. [The Victim] has had her right foot amputated. She also suffered minor injury to her right
hand as a result of the blast. She has a slight injury to her right eye, which was caused
by her helmet when she fell to the ground after the explosion. Annex E details the
medical report from the MACC QA Medical Officer.
[There were in fact two victims of this accident. The second person received a small shoulder
injury – as explained in the MACC medical report on the treatment given – which is
reproduced under “Medical report” for Victim No.1 at the Victims tab.]

Personnel
20. A list of personnel and their duties is detailed at Annex D to the [Demining group]
Preliminary Investigation Report. Written statements from the personnel involved in the
accident form the Appendices to this Annex.

Dress and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
21. At the time of the accident [the Victim] was wearing personal protective equipment in
accordance with [Demining group] SOPs.

Tools and Equipment
22. [The Victim] was not using any tools at the time of the accident.

Details of Mine Involved
23. PMA2 AP Blast Mine [large picture removed].
24. The mine involved is believed to be a PMA2 anti-personnel blast mine. It has a plastic
body which encases100gm of TNT explosives and has a friction-sensitive chemical fuse
and detonator. A minimum pressure of 5 kg is required to initiate this mine.

Account of Activities
25. The following is a description of the events from the time of the accident until the casualty
was at the hospital:

Tuesday 22 May 2001
•

1125hrs – Time of accident.

•

1125hrs – Team reports accident to [Demining group] base (callsign 52) that they have
an accident on their site with one section leader who has a traumatic amputation of the
foot. They request a helicopter CASEVAC at HLS Red-26.

•

1126hrs – 52 calls 51 (senior partner MNB(W)) and reports the accident detail.

•

1127hrs – 51 calls KFOR, MNB (W) callsign kilo foxtrot (KF) and reports that there is a
mine accident and a helicopter CASEVAC is required at HLS Red-26. KF acknowledges.

•

1131hrs – 51 requests from KF the arrival time of the helicopter to the HLS. KF did not
provide an answer.

•

1137hrs – 51 once again requests from KF the arrival time of the helicopter.
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•

1140hrs – KF enquires as to the injuries of the casualty. 51 replies that the casualty has
an amputation of the foot.

•

1149hrs – KF requests the name of the casualty, 51 gives it as [the Victim].

•

1153hrs – KF confirms that the helicopter will arrive at the HLS in five minutes.

•

1159hrs – The helicopter arrives at the HLS.

•

1207hrs – The helicopter arrives at the Italian Field Hospital in Peja.

Insurance Details
26. [The Victim] is covered by the [Demining group] personal insurance it has for all staff. All
insurance policies for [Demining group] are through Willis Insurance Group of London. A
copy of the insurance detail is kept in the MACC QA Office.

Conclusions
27. Based on the investigation, interviews, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of
Inquiry concludes the following:
•

The threat assessment made for this minefield by the [Demining group] Operations
Officer and agreed to by the MACC QA Officer, was that all mine rows are to be located,
and excavation would be carried out to a depth of 5cm.

•

All blast mines located in this minefield (over 100 to date) have been within the excavated
depth of 5 cm.

•

This mine was not located during the excavation drill as it was at a depth of 16cm.

•

There have been instances in the past whereby mines have been located at depths of
greater than 20cm in the Rasha Koshare minefields. However this was only in mine rows
in close proximity to streams where soil had built up as a result of floods. This was not a
factor in this case.

•

There are normally two blast mines as keepers for each fragmentation mine in this
minefield. In this instance three PMA2 blast mines were located next to a PMR2
fragmentation mine. This third blast mine was not consistent with the pattern that had
been established in this minefield. The fourth blast mine followed this inconsistency and
was at a greater depth than the other three.

•

There were no breaches of [Demining group] procedures.

•

This is the fifth mine accident that [Demining group] have had in the Rasha Koshare
minefields since 22 May this year.

•

The helicopter CASEVAC procedure went well, and was a vast improvement from the
previous accident. The major concern in the past being the communications problem due
to the English speaking ability of the KFOR radio operator.

•

KFOR had the helicopter on site at the HLS within 32 minutes of being notified.

Recommendations
28. The following are recommendations based on the Board of Inquiry conclusions:
•

In light of the fact that this is the fifth mine accident that [Demining group] have had in the
past eight weeks, all [Demining group] clearance operations are to be suspended for a
period of no less than one week. This time is to be utilised to re-evaluate all clearance
plans for all minefields that [Demining group] are responsible for. It is also to be used as
a period for [Demining group] as an organisation to regain composure and refocus before
continuing.
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•

The clearance depth for the Rasha Koshare minefields are to be amended to take into
consideration the depth of this mine that has been proven to be greater than 5cm.

•

[Demining group] are not to commence clearance operations until the MACC QA Officer
has ratified the amended clearance depth.

Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Center, Quality Assurance Officer
Annexes:
A.
MACC convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry.
B.
Map of the general area.
C.
Schematic diagram of the general accident area.
D.
[Demining group] Threat Assessment for minefield number 305. [Not made available.]
E.
Medical report from the MACC QA Officer. [See Medical report at the Victim tab.]

Attachment:
[Demining group] Preliminary Investigation Report

Comments by the MACC Chief Operations Officer
This accident is considered to be unfortunate but non-preventable. It is more a reflection of
the technical difficulties and heavy density of the mines in this area.
The Threat Assessment for this area was valid, was based on current information and
indicators and simply now needs to be adjusted to take into account the changing
circumstances.
The Conclusions and Recommendations of the Board of Inquiry are fully endorsed and
concurred with.

Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Center, Chief of Operations

Comments by the MACC Programme Manager
The conclusions and recommendations of this BOI are concurred with.
The threat assessment made by [the Demining group] for this minefield is considered to be
valid, however this accident has subsequently proven that even with supposedly reliable
records, anomalies can occur. It is highly unusual for the PMA-2 mine to be buried at such a
depth, if indeed it was a PMA-2. The lack of evidence at the accident site makes it extremely
difficult to draw firm conclusions.
If it was a PMA-2, this would be the first instance that this has been encountered in Kosovo,
and there have been more than 5,000 PMA-2 cleared to date. Regardless of the mine type
however, it is not possible to determine whether it was deliberately buried at this depth, or this
was caused by natural factors. The fact that the mine was so out of place with the pattern and
the record is also a fact that is difficult to explain.
Therefore the recommendation to stop current activities to enable a complete reassessment
to be conducted is fully warranted at this time. Once this has occurred and a revised plan
agreed upon, activities can commence in this area.

Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Center, Programme Manager
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Victim Report
Victim number: 518

Name: Name removed
Gender: Female

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 47 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: frontal apron, helmet,
long visor

Helmet
Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arm
minor Eye
minor Hand
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The following medical report was made available. It is the first mention of a second victim of
this accident.

Medical report concerning Rasa Koshare accident 20/07/01.
This report is based on interviews/statements of the following persons:
• Dr. [name excised, Demining group] Medical Coordinator.
• Mrs. [name excised] Medical Team Leader of Rrasa Koshare VIII Medical Team.
• Mr. [name excised] Medic of the Rrasa Koshare VIII Medical Team.
• Mrs. [name excised Demining group] Section Leader (Victim)
• Dr. [name excised] Surgeon at Italian KFOR Hospital in Peja
Victims:
• Mrs. [name excised] Section Leader.
• Mr. [name excised]: Deminer

Injuries:
Mrs. [Victim No.1] was taken by helicopter to KFOR Hospital in Peja and treated for:
•

Traumatic amputation of right foot with concomitant destruction of surrounding
tissues.

•

Burn wound on the lower part of right arm.
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•

Hemathoma on right eyelid.

Mr. [Victim No.2] was taken care of at location for:
•

Superficial cuts on the back of his right shoulder.

Attachments:
•

[Demining group] Accident report by Medical Coordinator [name excised]. [Not
made available.]

•

The sequence of events, by Medical Coordinator [name excised].

Introduction:
At the time of the accident there was one Ambulance and two Medics with all their medical
equipment at the site.
At 11:25 they where called on radio by TSL [name excised] who was close to the place of the
accident. The Medical Team arrived to the line after 2 minutes, [Victim No.1] had then been
carried by stretcher to a safe area.
The Medical Team Leader decided to transport the victim [No.1] by helicopter to KFOR
Hospital in Peja. KFOR was contacted through NPA at 11:27 and a request for Helicopter
MEDEVAC was sent.
The victim [No.1] was conscious and responsive in full and logical verbal contact, airways
intact and open, respiratory pattern and rate, pulse rate and blood pressure within normal
limits.
The Medics immediately started with first aid and stabilization of the victim who was bleeding
and was in big pain.
The bleeding was stopped. 20mg Morphine and 1000 ml Ringer Lactate was given iv.
She also got Oxygen 15 l/min. and a Stiffneck Collar applied.
At 11:59 the Helicopter arrived to the HLS (32 minutes after the request) and the victim [No.1]
was transported to Italian KFOR Hospital in Peja accompanied by the [Demining group]
Medical Team.
The other victim, [N0.2, name excised] had only minor injuries on the back of his right
shoulder and was taken care of at location by another Medical Team.

Order of events:
Time

Event

11:25hrs

Accident occurred.

11:27hrs

Victim No.1 receives first aid treatment at the safe area.

11:27hrs

Request for CASEVAC helicopter KFOR

11:59hrs

CASEVAC helicopter arrived at HLS.

12:02hrs

CASEVAC helicopter departed from HLS with victim No.1 onboard.

12:12hrs

CASEVAC helicopter arrives at Italian Field Hospital in Peja.

Conclusions:
CASEVAC was performed according to S.O.P.
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Overall CASEVAC time was 47 min.
The treatment/assessment that[Victim No.1] received by the [Demining group] Medical
Team at the scene of accident and by surgeons at Italian KFOR Hospital in Peja was
carried out in a very professional way.

Recommendations:
Make arrangements for a psychological debriefing for all personnel working for the
organisation.

Signed: Medical Quality Assurance Officer, MACC Kosovo

Victim Report
Victim number: 519

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not applicable

Protection issued: None

Protection used: not recorded

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Shoulder
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate survey” because the methods
being used in the minefield were incapable of finding the threat mines reliably. The
investigator observed that all mines found so far had been within 5cm of the surface – but
since the group was only looking to within 5cm of the surface, it follows that all found mines
MUST have been inside that depth. The secondary cause is listed as a “Management/control
inadequacy” because both the demining group and the MACC wrongly assessed the risk in
the area. While the demining group’s clearance was stopped, it is disturbing to note that no
immediate recommendation to re-clear the area already processed was made.
As the MACC Programme Manager observed in his comments at the end of the Accident
report, it is not clear why the investigators decided the mine was a PMA-2. The severity of the
injury (with a foot blown cleanly off) more closely matches that anticipated with a PMA-1,
which were also known to be in the area. The fact that a second person was injured add
weight to the view that the mine may have been the bigger PMA-1. Also, the PMA-2 is
intended to be laid with its pressure spider above ground. The PMA-1 can be laid effectively
at greater depth, so was more likely to have been more deeply concealed.
That said, it is not explained how the investigators determined the depth of the device – which
is an inexact science at best when investigating very small blasts – and so it is possible that
the PMA-1 was not deeply buried and was missed simply because it was out of the
anticipated pattern.
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The investigators omitted mention of one victim and failed to identify the mine. These failings
are recorded under Notes as an “inadequate investigation”.
The demining group’s failure to deploy a metal-detector was common in the area at the time,
but rested on misconceptions about the capacity of metal-detectors that have since been
recognised.
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